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 We propose an extension to Boyer & PetersenÕs (B&PÕs) framework for folk-economic 
beliefs, suggesting that certain evolutionarily acquired cognitive inference systems can cause 
modern humans to perceive abstract systems such as the economy as willful, goal-oriented 
agents. Such an anthropomorphized view, we argue, can have meaningful effects on peopleÕs 
moral evaluations of these agents, as well as on their political and economic behavior.  
 
 Boyer & Petersen (B&P) provide a compelling framework for a variety of folk beliefs 
about the economy (FEBs), focusing on biases attributable to evolutionarily acquired intuitive 
inference systems and certain cognitive dispositions that foster their cultural transmission. We 
propose an extension of B&PÕs framework, suggesting that people have specific beliefs about the 
economy itself, which may partly account for deviations from normative understandings of 
economic processes, and which may affect peopleÕs political beliefs and economic behaviors. 
Specifically, in line with Adam SmithÕs metaphor of an Òinvisible handÓ that governs the market, 
we argue that people anthropomorphize economy-related constructs such as Òthe economy,Ó Òthe 
free market,Ó or Òcapitalism,Ó and view them as willful, goal-oriented agents. 
 
This phenomenon, we contend, arises as a side-effect of an intuitive tendency to perceive 
minds and bodies as separate entities, which in itself seems to be rooted in fundamental cognitive 
systems that humans acquired in their ancestral past (Bloom 2004; Forstmann & Burgmer 2015; 
2017). When upholding social relations became a crucial factor in human survival (see Barton & 
Dunbar 1997), humans developed mentalizing capacities Ð that is, the ability to infer mental 
states of others and to use that information to explain observed behavior (Frith & Frith 2003). 
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Assuming an unobservable underlying cause for othersÕ behavior allows generalizing about how 
they will react to specific situations in the future Ð an obvious advantage over someone who 
lacks these capacities. Attributing goals, intentions, and motives to others (and actively seeking 
this information) thereby prevents a stressful state of uncertainty, and indirectly serves to satisfy 
Òeffectance motivation Ð the basic and chronic motivation to attain mastery of oneÕs 
environmentÓ (Waytz et al. 2010, p. 410). 
 
Because of this evolutionary advantage, it is no surprise that humans possess what has in 
the past been described as a Òhyperactive agency detection deviceÓ (Barrett 2000), an adaptive 
sensitivity for detecting human agency, which is so pronounced that it can produce a bias to 
perceive non-existent intentional agency in oneÕs environment (Heider & Simmel 1944), a 
phenomenon Boyer (2001) refers to as a Òhypertrophy of social cognition.Ó Such a bias can exist 
only because mental states are not merely construed as the product of a configuration of uniquely 
human brain states, but as a property that can be ascribed to just about anything. According to 
previous theorizing, the tendency to conceptually distinguish minds from bodies is an almost 
logical by-product of our speciesÕ mentalizing skills. While othersÕ behavior is visible and 
readily accessible, their mental states are not and must therefore be construed differently (Bloom 
2004).  
 
This differential construal, paired with the adaptive motivation to see agency in the 
world, can make people perceive human mental states in nonhuman, and sometimes bodiless, 
entities (Boyer 2001). According to anecdotal reports, even our closest evolutionary relatives, 
great apes, engage in social signaling (using dominance displays) with forces of nature, such as 
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thunderstorms or waterfalls, as if they were interacting with agents that have threatening 
intentions (Montgomery 1991). 
 
For human beings, such a disembodied mind perception allows for beliefs in animism 
(e.g., a belief in a spirit inhabiting a river that can become angry and cause a flood), theism (e.g., 
a belief in a bodiless god that judges us), or in souls that can exist after bodily death (Bering 
2006; Boyer 2001). Notably, such beliefs were not evolutionarily disadvantageous and still exist 
today, just as the underlying cognitive mechanisms responsible for them still exist. Only today, 
people also ascribe mental states to entire nations, groups of people (Waytz & Young 2012), or 
corporations (Rai & Diermeier 2015).  
 
Likewise, people frequently use language that anthropomorphizes economy-related 
concepts (Òthe goal of capitalism is X,Ó ÒY hurts the economy,Ó etc.), and some of the FEBs that 
B&P discuss, such as emporiophobia (the fear of markets; Rubin 2014), align with this notion. 
As B&P state, these abstract constructs have mechanisms that are in principle unobservable 
(Nozick 1994). Yet, in reality, people witness a constantly changing socio-economic 
environment, and they are eager to perceive these changes as being caused by a single 
responsible entity. Just as ascribing anger to a spirit inhabiting a river, this approach simplifies a 
complex system, allows prediction, and thereby satisfies effectance motivation. 
 
When economic systems or the economy itself are understood in anthropomorphic terms, 
it is likely to affect how people react to the respective entityÕs apparent ÒbehaviorÓ (Chartrand et 
al. 2008). Just like apes facing a thunderstorm, people who anthropomorphize the economy are 
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suddenly confronted with a seemingly all-powerful and potentially malevolent entity that is 
responsible for the current state of the world around them. They perceive a willful agent that 
engages in semi-coherent, goal-directed behavior, rather than a set of individual structures and 
conditions spanning various social and economic domains, each with its own causes and 
consequences. Normally, each of these structures, when perceived as flawed, could be the 
individual target for modification or reconstruction (Connor 2016), whereas any attempt at 
change could be viewed as hopeless when these structures are construed as characteristics of a 
larger, more powerful, entity Ð as fingers of the invisible hand, so to say. Therefore, on the one 
hand, contrary to the assumed purpose of anthropomorphization, perceiving a powerful entity 
that follows its own agenda may, under some circumstances, paradoxically induce a perceived 
lack of control, and ultimately foster learned helplessness and obedience (see Prilleltensky & 
Gonick 1996). On the other hand, when anthropomorphizing abstract entities such as 
corporations, people typically ascribe to them agentic but no experiential mental states, 
considering them capable of being responsible for their actions, but not of being victims. 
Viewing the economy or the market as a moral agent allows people to perceive themselves as 
moral patients (or suffering victims), and to blame and direct moral outrage at this entity (Gray et 
al. 2012). Moral anger, as opposed to other negative emotions such as sadness, can in turn 
function as a catalyst for political or social action (Valentino et al. 2011). Future research may 
thus investigate under which conditions an anthropomorphization of economy-related constructs 
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